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Michael Berk1,2Abstract
The furore preceding the release of the new edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-5) is in contrast to the incremental changes to several diagnostic categories, which are derived from new
research since its predecessor’s birth in 1990. While many of these changes are indeed controversial, they do reflect
the intrinsic ambiguity of the extant literature. Additionally, this may be a mirror of the frustration of the field’s
limited progress, especially given the false hopes at the dawn of the “decade of the brain”. In the absence of a
coherent pathophysiology, the DSM remains no more than a set of consensus based operationalized adjectives,
albeit with some degree of reliability. It does not cleave nature at its joints, nor does it aim to, but neither does
alternate systems. The largest problem with the DSM system is how it’s used; sometimes too loosely by clinicians,
and too rigidly by regulators, insurers, lawyers and at times researchers, who afford it reference and deference
disproportionate to its overt acknowledged limitations.
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useful.” GEP Box [1]Editorial
There has been collective flurry of introspection, debate
and controversy about the impact and relevance and cri-
teria for the diagnoses proposed in the upcoming Diagnos-
tic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM),
Fifth Edition (DSM-5). At least part of the issue is the pre-
vailing zeitgeist; the launch of the DSM-III over three de-
cades ago was paralleled by a retrospectively unrealistic
enthusiasm for the manual, its validity and the potential to
haul a psychoanalytically oriented discipline into a scien-
tific era. The fundamental problem however remains; the
DSM is a symptom based classification, and there remains
no coherent pathophysiological foundation for the discip-
line, the edifice on which medical nosology traditionally is
built. It is unrealistic to expect phenomenology to track
pathophysiology; nowhere in the rest of medicine does
this occur. Cough, pyrexia or pain are all pleomorphic
manifestations of diverse pathologies, and depression, anx-
iety and psychosis are unlikely to be different. The issue isrrespondence: mikebe@barwonhealth.org.au
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system is clearly absent, but equally obviously, no valid al-
ternate system is in sight.
The climate has thus swung to a wintery disillusionment
regarding the perceived failures of the system, with little
enthusiasm for the changes, and in particular the expan-
sion of the number and subtypes of diagnostic categories.
An analogy is color; using the analogy that we have no
idea of the physics of light, that the construct of wave-
length even exists, let alone determines color, is it useful
to replace “blue” with a series of subtypes of “blue”
turquoise, aquamarine, azure, etc.? In this regard, the ex-
panded DSM-5 categorisation represents a greatly ex-
panded series of adjectives or metaphors, able to describe
what we see in a manner that is defined with some reli-
ability, even if it fails to explain why blue really is blue.
Biomarker research has largely not supported this
current nosology, with markers of cognition, imaging,
genetics, inflammation, oxidative stress and neurotrophins
showing remarkable homology across categories. Categor-
ies including psychotic, mood, personality disorders, and
anxiety disorders are associated with common etiological
factors including early childhood experiences, social
stressors, trauma, personality styles, interpersonal, family,
lifestyle, medical, with each factor playing a differential
role for each person. Lastly, with the possible exception of
lithium, where lithium responsivity does seem to parse a
clinically meaningful subgroup, almost all psychotropicsis an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
rg/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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response profiles, with the atypical antipsychotics an
exemplar.
Perhaps the major problem with the DSM system is not
the system itself, but how it is used. Firstly, clinicians rarely
use these categories rigidly, rather using them as best-fit,
pattern-recognition adjectives. Furthermore, there is a ten-
dency for clinicians to focus on axis 1 diagnoses, and while
the 5 axis system aims to capture additional domains, it is
not a substitute for a comprehensive clinical formulation
incorporating developmental history, attachment style,
cultural context, defence mechanisms, current life context
or the person’s experience of their disorder [2,3]. Phenom-
enology, as defined by the DSM-5 axis 1, represents the
pathophysiological fault line cracked open when the
moulded wedge of perception, personality, health and de-
velopment are struck by the mallet of life. Adjunctive use
of formulation adds to understanding which significant
factors may have influenced the person’s presentation;
identifying key obstacles; suggesting which interventions
might be more useful and anticipating which challenges
are likely to occur during the course of management. Sec-
ondly, regulators, insurers and the legal system frequently
take DSM categories at face value, and imbue them with a
level of deference that is discordant with their underlying
validity, setting structures in place that clinicians are
obliged to follow despite knowing intrinsically that they
are incorrect. The controversy regarding on versus off-
label prescription would be perhaps the exemplar.
All systems reflect the cultural system in which they
evolve, and the DSM-5 is no exception, being tailored to
a significant degree to the insurance, regulatory and
reimbursement systems in play in the USA. The 10th
edition of the International Classification of Diseases
(ICD-10), it’s not too distant sibling, arguably reflects a
more global set of inputs and might be more univer-
sally translatable, although it needs to be emphasised
that the similarities between the systems are far greater
than the differences, and the ICD solves none of the
primary issues that bedevil the DSM-5. Lastly, and per-
haps most seriously, using DSM categories as railway
tracks for research risks limiting the exploration of
novel or more promising nosologies or dichotomies.
So where does this leave us? The DSM-5 is a bit like
Churchill’s definition of democracy, being the worst pos-
sible system except for all the alternatives. It is a system of
metaphors and adjectives, that are capable of describing
phenomena with some degree of inter-rater reliability, and
the revised version has incorporated many of the advances
in knowledge in the past decades regarding course, out-
come and treatment response. It reflects the imperfection
of the field, and needs to be used, as should all models, as
something useful, acknowledging openly and consciously
that it remains fundamentally wrong [4].Competing interests
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